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TRIPTYCH:
SECTARIAN DISPUTES, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, AND TRANSNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
IN DRINAN'S
CAN GOD AND CAESAR COEXIST?
CHRISTOPHER J. BORGENt
INTRODUCTION
In 1993, Samuel Huntington famously proclaimed that we
are entering into an era of a "clash of civilizations."1  A
"civilization," however, is a rather abstract entity; people are not
abstract. When people clash about religion, it may or may not be
across some hypothesized "civilizational" boundary.
Sometimes the clash is more like a struggle between the
individual and his community. Consider the story of Abdul
Rahman, an Afghan man who converted to Christianity in 1990
at the age of twenty-five. 2 Sixteen years later, after the Taliban
collapsed, the new Afghan regime decided to try the now forty-
one-year-old Rahman for the crime of conversion from Islam.3
Afghanistan's law is based on the shari'a.4 The prosecutors
t Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. I would like to
thank Elizabeth Defeis and Mark Janis for their participation in this written
symposium. Father Robert Drinan was especially generous with his time and
comments; this essay is dedicated to his memory. This article was completed prior to
Father Drinan's passing away and I have kept the text unaltered, reflecting the
exchange of ideas that took place while he was alive rather than a reconsideration
after his passing. This article also benefited from the hard work of Francis
Cavanagh, Andrew Roop, and the editorial staff of the St. John's University Journal
of Catholic Legal Studies. Any mistakes are solely my own.
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Summer 1993, at 22; see also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996).
2 See Afghan on Trial for Christianity, BBC NEWS, Mar. 20, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/4823874.stm [hereinafter Afghan on Trial].
3 See id.
4 See, e.g., Andrea Elliott, In Kabul, a Test for Shariah, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
2006, § 4, at 43. Afghanistan's new Constitution accommodates shari'a and secular
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sought a death sentence for Rahman's conversion. The trial
judge explained: "We will ask him if he has changed his mind. If
so we will forgive him."5 If Rahman had not changed his mind,
his mental state would have been assessed and then he would
have faced a possible execution. Luckily for Rahman,
Afghanistan allowed him to move to Italy where he was granted
asylum.6
Or consider the story of Luigi Cascioli, a seventy-two-year-
old Italian atheist who sued Enrico Righi, a seventy-five year-old
priest from his village, for the alleged crime of fraudulently
maintaining that Jesus Christ existed historically and is the Son
of God. 7 As Cascioli expected, an Italian court dismissed the suit.
This now gives him the ability to appeal to the European Court
on Human Rights ("ECHR") under what he calls a theory of
"religious racism." It is reported that the ECHR has agreed to
hear the case." If the ECHR does so, it will likely ask for
evidence upon which the Catholic Church maintains the
existence and divinity of Christ.
Sometimes, however, the clash does seem to be civilizational.
This may be the only way to make sense of the rioting and
demonstrations around the world in early 2006 due to cartoons,
originally published in Denmark, portraying Mohammed in a
satiric light.9 After Islamic states diplomatically protested the
publication of the cartoons as being religiously insensitive,
Denmark apologized. Newspapers from Spain, Italy, France, and
Germany then re-printed the cartoons in a show of support for
the principle of freedom of the press. Muslims around the world,
angered over what they saw as religious bigotry, took to the
law alike, "but it is still unclear how successfully they will coexist." Id. Apostasy, or
"the act of renouncing one's faith.., is a grave sin in Islam, and according to
classical Shariah, it warrants a punishment of execution." Id.
5 Afghan on Trial, supra note 2.
6 See Ian Fisher & Elisabetta Povoledo, Italy Grants Asylum to Afghan
Christian Convert, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at A14.
7 See Eric J. Lyman, Italian Atheist Sues Priest over Jesus' Existence, USA
TODAY, Jan. 31, 2006, at 8A.
8 See Anderson Cooper 360' Blog, http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/
anderson.cooper.360/blog/2006/05/how-do-you-prove-jesus-existed.html (stating the
European Court of Human Rights has agreed to consider the case). Cascioli's
application to the ECHR is available on Cascioli's home page:
http://www.luigicascioli.it/29processo-eng.php.
9 See Q & A: The Muhammad Cartoons Row, BBC NEWS, Feb. 7, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/4677976.stm.
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streets in a series of increasingly violent and ultimately deadly
protests. 10
Can international law be used to address these and other
conflicts that arise out of questions of the freedom of religion?
Modern international law was born of conflicts of politics and
religion. The Treaty of Westphalia, the seed from which grew
today's systems of international law and international relations,
attempted to set out rules to end decades of religious strife and
war across the European continent." The treaty replaced
empires and feudal holdings with a system of sovereign states.' 2
But this was within a relatively narrow and historically
interconnected community: Protestants and Catholics, yes, but
Christians all. Europe was Christendom.
To what extent can international law be an effective tool for
delineating and protecting religious freedom around the world in
the 21st century? In Can God and Caesar Coexist?, Father
Robert Drinan sketches a preliminary answer.' 3  While
Westphalia largely took religion out of international law, Father
Drinan considers how international law may mediate and
moderate conflicts over religious freedom. 14
It is an ambitious project, to say the least. Father Drinan
claims no simple solution, but rather offers suggestions on how to
proceed. One central concept in his discussion is the
establishment of an international tribunal to resolve conflicts
over religious rights, much as the ECHR and the Inter-American
10 Id.; see also Salman Masood, 2 Die as Pakistan Cartoon Rage Turns Violent,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at A6.
11 See Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France
and Their Respective Allies, Oct. 24, 1648, reprinted in 1 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF
MODERN HISTORY: 1648-1967, at 7 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1967). The Treaty of
Westphalia memorialized the end of the Thirty Years War, which "began as a
religious struggle between rival leagues of Catholic and Protestant states within the
Holy Roman Empire" and eventually marked the decline of the Hapsburg dynasty.
Id. at 3-5.
12 See id. ("The Peace of Westphalia is a fitting beginning for the study of
modern diplomacy. It expresses the emergence of the modern secular state system
based on the existence of a plurality of sovereign 'powers'....").
13 See ROBERT F. DRINAN, S.J., CAN GOD & CAESAR COEXIST? BALANCING
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM & INTERNATIONAL LAw (2004).
14 See id. at 15 ("[I]t is not impossible that in the near future one of the central
issues in the area of human rights will be the level of attention and enforcement that
world law will accord to the boundaries of religious freedom.").
20061
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Court on Human Rights ("IACHR") do for human rights more
generally. 15
A tribunal focusing on the international law of religious
rights has never existed. Faith in the work of international
institutions, however, is a hallmark of mainstream international
legal jurisprudence, particularly from the Victorian era to today,
but with roots that delve much deeper into the earth of the
profession. In this instance, is such faith misplaced?
Part I of this essay will consider Father Drinan's proposal as
part of the "modernist" tradition of international legal
jurisprudence. Aspects of Father Drinan's argument are
especially similar to conceptions of international law elucidated
by Hersch Lauterpacht, perhaps the greatest twentieth-century
exponent of legal modernism. Both Lauterpacht and Drinan
draw from a worldview defined by the European Enlightenment
and the start of what is commonly called the Age of Reason.
After situating the proposals of Can God and Caesar Coexist?
within international law's tradition, Part II will turn to a pair of
relatively recent methods of criticizing the "traditional" view of
international law: rational choice theory and so-called "critical"
or new stream perspectives on international law. Although these
perspectives have at times been linked with politically
conservative (rational choice theory) and liberal (new stream)
viewpoints, Part II will argue that they are better understood as
atavistic conceptions of law that have earlier manifestations in
the theories of the Enlightenment philosophes and of their
Romantic critics. As such, legal modernism, new stream theory,
and rational choice perspectives are methodological siblings,
borne of the Age of Reason and now squabbling over the
intellectual inheritance of their parents. They may be better off
sharing the wealth and helping each other.
With this discussion as a base, Part III will return to Father
Drinan's proposal and how it may profit from the perspectives of
rational choice and the new stream. While new stream and
rational choice theorists are each critical of the perspective of
mainstream international law, each can learn from the other in
considering how to address the sectarian struggles of today. We
must trace the path from Lauterpacht to bin Laden, from the
15 See, e.g., id. at 5-6 (considering the creation of a tribunal concerning religious
freedom), 86-87 (concerning the ECHR and religious freedom).
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Concert of Europe to the era of Jihad vs. McWorld because, in
the end, Father Drinan's project challenges us to consider how
the tools of the Enlightenment apply to the Age of Terrorism.
I. ROBERT DRINAN AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MODERNISM
A. Father Drinan's Proposal
Beginning with an observation that the United Nations
human rights system "assumes that the right to religious
freedom is equal in importance to the right to freedom of speech
and assembly and the right to be free from discrimination based
on race and gender," Father Drinan's central concern is how
religious freedom can be better protected around the world. 16
The answer, in part, lies in the prudential construction of
international regimes and institutions. Mirroring the process of
institutionalizing human rights after World War II, Father
Drinan suggests that the 1981 United Nations Declaration on
Religious Freedom ("Religious Freedom Declaration") is a good
text from which an eventual treaty could be shaped.17
Much as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, a
General Assembly resolution from 1948, led to the drafting of the
core international human rights treaties, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR"), the Religious Freedom Declaration is a non-binding
United Nations resolution that nonetheless allows states to reach
a consensus as to the scope of certain rights and freedoms.' 8
Often called "soft law," such hortatory or aspirational documents
can become the seedlings from which binding treaties and
conventions (like the ICCPR and ICESCR) grow.19
16 DRINAN, supra note 13, at 41.
17 See id. at 213 (describing the 1981 United Nations Declaration on Religious
Freedom as "[t]he best attempt at formulating some kind of legal code between God
and Caesar").
18 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) (Dec. 10,
1948), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html; International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), available at
http://www.unhchr.chthtml/menu3/b/a-ccpr.htm; International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966),
available at http//www.unhchr.ch/htmi/menu3fb/a_cescr.htm.
19 On soft law, generally, see COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF
NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed.,
20061
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But a treaty is not the end of Father Drinan's proposal. The
idea to which he keeps returning is the establishment of an
international tribunal that would be devoted to resolving
disputes that arise out of the posited Covenant on Religious
Freedom. 20 Father Drinan does not define exactly what such a
tribunal would look like, but does draw comparisons to the
ECHR. 21 Such a tribunal would thus allow individuals to file
suits against their own country, or any other state that was a
signatory to the Religious Freedom Covenant, for violations of
that state's obligations under the Covenant. 22 One could imagine
suits based on events such as those described in the introduction
or a host of other problems being argued before the tribunal.
As Father Drinan admits, it is not known what the final
result of his proposal would be. He asks:
What will be the consequences of this new world law granting
the freedom to act on one's "conscience, religion or belief'? For
the first time in history there are norms discouraging nations
from punishing an individual who acts contrary to law because
of a moral conviction derived from conscience. Will it work?23
I have no answer as to what the final result would be of
drafting such a treaty and institutionalizing a tribunal to hear
disputes arising from it. Rather, I wish to examine some of the
difficulties in building these institutions and consider ways to
overcome these impediments. At the heart of my analysis is the
belief that although, as Father Drinan contends, there is a formal
equality among religious freedom and rights of freedom of speech
and assembly-the same enforcement mechanisms exist for each
of these rights as they are all part of the same instrument, the
ICCPR, with the same Optional Protocol-the application of such
enforcement mechanism would be much more contentious in
regards to religion than in these other freedoms. The conflicts
2000) and Gunther F. Handl et al., A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 371 (1988).
20 See supra notes 14 and 15 and accompanying text.
21 See id. at 89.
22 I will use the term "transnational tribunal" to describe a tribunal in which an
individual or subnational group is able to maintain a right of action against a state.
By this nomenclature, the term "international tribunal" is used for tribunals that
resolve disputes between states. I discuss transnational tribunals and domestic legal
change at greater length in Christopher J. Borgen, Transnational Tribunals and the
Hegemony of Process, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript
at 2, on file with author).
23 See DRINAN, supra note 13, at 22.
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over using a transnational tribunal may outweigh the benefits of
establishing such a tribunal.
But to chart a way forward, we first need to look back.
B. The Enlightenment and the Tradition of Legal Modernism
Father Drinan's analysis and proposal speak with the same
optimism that is found in much international legal scholarship
with its roots in the humanism and rationality of the
Enlightenment. As described by Professor Brian Tamanaha:
The Enlightenment Philosophes' distinctive contribution was to
extend the application of reason and science to the social,
political, legal, economic, and moral realms. They believed that
a science of man could be developed which would allow
government and society to be designed to give rise to a more
just, rational existence. 24
This not only included scrutinizing the religious teachings of
the Church, but also a fundamental reordering of the relationship
between church and state. 25 In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia
was concluded, ending the era of religious wars in Europe.
Besides defining the modern international system around the
sovereignty of states, Westphalia also played a role in the
evolution of the concept of religious freedom. Although it
"stopped short of providing individuals with freedom of
religion,... the treaty nevertheless asserted the right to
religious asylum and states' prerogative to select their own
religion."26 Westphalia is thus a key text in both the history of
international law and of the protection of religious freedom.
These ideas concerning religious freedom were adopted and
expanded upon by John Locke, such as in his Letter Concerning
Toleration from 1690, and other Enlightenment-era writers. 27
Locke and the French philosophes in turn influenced the leaders
of the American Revolution in general and Thomas Jefferson in
particular.28
24 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 39
(2004).
25 See id.
26 MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES
TO THE GLOBALIZATION ERA 78 (2004).
27 See id.; JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Patrick Romanell
ed., Liberal Arts Press 1950) (1960).
28 See ISHAY, supra note 26, at 81. "Thomas Jefferson ... championed the right
of the individual to religious opinion and freedom of conscience based on the
2006]
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Although the philosophy of the Age of Reason would go
through many permutations from the Enlightenment into
Romanticism, followed by Neo-Classicism, Neo-realism,
Symbolism, Aestheticism, Nihilism, Modernism, and today's
Postmodernism, 29 the mainstream of international legal theory
flowed directly from the headwaters of the Enlightenment and
directly into Victorian Modernism.30  The Enlightenment
contributed the belief in universal values as well as the
conviction that the world could be improved through the
judicious application of reason to dispel myths and superstitions.
The careful application of reason would allow the universal
values to become clear and reason would allow us to design the
institutions to order society around those values. The modernists
of the Victorian era and after took this faith in reason and
focused on building international institutions-ranging from
individual treaties to the attempts to "outlaw" war at the turn on
the twentieth century to the League of Nations to the United
Nations-that reflected a belief in the existence of universal
values and the possibility of rational management of conflicts. 31
By considering Father Drinan's work as part of this tradition
of legal modernism, the mainstream of international
reasoning of Locke, Paine, and the French philosophes." Id. at 80.
29 See JOHN RALSTON SAUL, VOLTAIRE'S BASTARDS: THE DICTATORSHIP OF
REASON IN THE WEST 15 (1992).
30 Jurisprudential periods do not follow the same nomenclature as this timeline
of general philosophy. Legal academics disagree both as to the periodization and the
naming of different eras in international jurisprudence. For example, the German
historian Wilhelm Grewe calls international law from the fifteenth century until
1919 "classical" international law and everything since 1919 "post-classical"
international law. See WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
575 (Michael Byers, trans., 2000) (1984). Together, according to Grewe, classical and
post-classical international law make modern international law, as contrasted to
medieval international law. Id. David Kennedy refers to the "traditional period" of
international legal scholarship as being from roughly 1700-1900 followed by the
"modern era." See David Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship,
7 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 17, 26 (1988). For the purposes of this article, I will refer to the
"mainstream" legal style exemplified from the turn of the century to the present day
as 'legal modernism" or "traditional" international law. Since the 1980s, there has
been an increase in international scholarship related to the Critical Legal Studies
movement. I will refer to this as the "new stream" of international jurisprudence or
"post-modern" international legal scholarship.
31 See ISHAY, supra note 26, at 174, 177. But see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE
GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-
1960 433 (2001) (discussing the shortcomings of the Kellogg-Briand Pact as an
attempt to outlaw war).
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jurisprudence from the 19th and 20th centuries, we can perhaps
gain a deeper view into strengths and weaknesses of his
argument. To do this, I want to turn briefly to Hersch
Lauterpacht, perhaps the greatest exponent of international legal
modernism in the first half of the twentieth century.32 In certain
ways, Lauterpacht was the quintessential Victorian, even though
the Victorian Age was gone, replaced by World Wars and nuclear
bombs. 33 Yet how he addressed the problems of his day can give
us an insight into how Father Drinan approaches questions of
religious liberty as we transition from the Cold War through the
"Post Cold War" and into what some have called the "Age of
Terror."
Hersch Lauterpacht was born in 1897 and died in London in
1960.34  He was a teacher, at both the London School of
Economics and Cambridge University; a scholar, writing
numerous books and articles on a wide variety of concerns to
international law; and ultimately, from 1955 to 1960, a judge on
the International Court of Justice. 35
International law in the nineteenth century was a time of
tension and promise. The tension was between natural law and
positivism. A belief in natural law, rights that exist regardless of
the sovereign decisions of states,36 was particularly strong in the
European academy. Natural law theorists of a previous era
32 Regarding the life and work of Hersch Lauterpacht, see generally Nathan
Feinberg, Hersch Lauterpacht--Jurist and Thinker, 3 ISRAEL L. REV. 333 (1968); Dr.
C. Wilfred Jenks, Hersch Lauterpacht-The Scholar as Prophet, 36 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 1 (1960); lain G.M. Scobbie, The Theorist as Judge: Hersch Lauterpact's Concept of
the International Judicial Function, 8 EUR J. INT'L L. 264 (1997).
33 See generally KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 31, at 353-412 (discussing
Lauterpacht and his Victorian values).
34 See Jenks, supra note 32, at 1.
35 See, e.g., H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE SOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1927); H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY (1933); H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1947);
H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950); H.
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT (1958). Lauterpacht was also the editor of four editions of the treatise
International Law: A Treatise. See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
TREATISE (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1961). Those editions came to be known as
"Lauterpacht's Oppenheim." See Ricard B. Bilder, Oppenheim's International Law,
Vol. I, Peace, 88 Am. J. INT'L L. 383, 383 (1994) (book review). For a brief biography,
including Lauterpacht's career at the London School of Economics and Cambridge
University, see KOSKENNIEIMI, supra note 31, at 376, 388.
36 See Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32
HARV. INT'L L.J. 81, 82 (1991).
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believed that law was the will of God; after the Enlightenment it
emanated from reason. For positivists, law was the result of
sovereign decision-making; states signed on to treaties or formed
customary international law.37 One found law based not on the
proper understanding of universal reason, but on the
discoverable facts upon which states agreed. The modernists
thus had a tension in their legal theory.
Theoretical tensions notwithstanding, the turn of the
century was also the time of a great flowering of modernist
projects. The Hague Peace Conferences attempted to codify rules
to regulate and ultimately end wars. 38 Inter-state arbitration
was growing at a rapid pace, providing states with juridical,
rational alternatives to war.39 Societies of international law were
being founded in the United States and Europe.40 The promise of
the Enlightenment was bearing fruit in legal modernism.
Perhaps no greater shock could have come to Lauterpacht,
who "[s]ituat[ed] international law within a historical trajectory
of European thought towards a Kantian, cosmopolitan law,"41
than the horrors of the First World War. Wilhelm Grewe, in his
magisterial The Epochs of International Law remarks that "the
end of the First World War is almost unanimously considered by
historians of international law as constituting the end of an
epoch" greater than the shifts of 1648 (Westphalia) or 1815 (the
end of the Napoleonic Wars and the start of the Concert of
Europe).42 The blooming of internationalist thought from the late
Victorian era was engulfed by the hard winter that lasted from
the beginning of the First World War to the end of the Second.
As Martti Koskenniemi explains: "To find a place for law in [the]
37 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (2002).
38 See George H. Aldrich and Christine M. Chinkin, Symposium: The Hague
Peace Conferences, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2000) (introducing and situating the
historical significance of the Hague Peace Conferences in international law).
39 See GREWE, supra note 30, at 611 (listing the number of newly concluded
arbitration treaties for the period of 1920-1945, which shows a peak in 1929 and
then a sharp decline after 1933).
40 See Monroe Leigh & Cristian DeFrancia, International Law Societies and the
Development of International Law, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 941, 941-43 (2001) (describing
the development of international law societies beginning in the late nineteenth
century). See, e.g., The American Society of International Law, http://www.asil.org
(last visited Aug. 1, 2006); The European Society of International Law,
http://www.esil.sedi.org/english (last visited Aug. 1, 2006); The International Law
Association, http://www.ila-hq.org/html/frame-top.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2006).
41 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 31, at 358.
42 GREWE, supra note 30, at 575.
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dangerous time [of the interwar period], Lauterpacht looks back
into the middle of the nineteenth century and hopes to
resuscitate its liberal rationalism and its ideal of the rule of law,
its belief in progress, its certainty about the sense and direction
of history. . . ."43 While other theorists, such as Hans Kelsen,
considered theories of the irrational behavior of the public, "it
would have been unthinkable for Lauterpacht to integrate such
disturbing evidence into his ordered world. For Lauterpacht,
even at the worst of times, the world remains a whole, united in
the rational pursuit of liberal ideals."44
It is somewhat ironic that in the midst of this worldwide
crisis that for many denied the efficacy of international law,
international law made strides in making the philosophy of the
Enlightenment part of actual statecraft in embedding natural
law concepts within positivistic instruments. Until the interwar
period, universal rights were only a theoretical construct, not
part of actual diplomatic practice. Rights, be they collective
rights such as sovereignty or individual rights such as the
freedom of speech, were viewed by many leading lawyers as
being culturally contingent. Imperial states distinguished
between what they viewed as "'civilized' nations, 'barbarous' and
'semi-barbarous' communities and 'savages.' "45 The interwar
period saw a withering away of the argument that international
law must be based on Western civilization and there was
increased acceptance that the "international legal order [applied]
to all States, regardless of their race, culture or geographical
location."46 Grewe explains:
Together with the formula "all the nations of the earth," which
was used by most treaties in order to express the now-dominant
idea of a universal international legal community of mankind,
the terms "society of nations," "international community,"
"soci6t6 oecum6nique du droit des gens" and "soci~t6
internationale globale" were employed in the literature. In this
way, the general, all-embracing "societas humana" which had
formed the centerpiece of the system of great rationalist legal
philosophers of the eighteenth century, as well as the "soci6tO
des nations" of Vattel and the legal thinkers of the French
43 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 31, at 355.
44 Id. at 360.
45 GREWE, supra note 30, at 582.
46 Id. at 581.
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Revolution--conceptions which had always been confined to
theoretical speculation and never accepted by the practical law
of nations of Europe-now entered positive treaty law. 47
This recognition of universal rights in positive law set the
stage for a shift in Lauterpacht's work. In response to the
collapse of the Victorian attempt to use international law as a
scientifically-based constraint on foreign policy, but with the
recognition of the universality of international law, Lauterpacht
turned his efforts after World War II towards human rights and
an attempt to "articulate in ethical terms the political unity that
had seemed lost." 48 Lauterpacht wrote one of the central texts of
the post-war emphasis on human rights, simply titled
International Law and Human Rights. 49  As described by
Koskenniemi, in Lauterpacht's book:
Words such as "fundamental," "inalienable," and "sanctity"
abound, underlin[e] the ahistorical, quasi-religious seriousness
of human rights. The book's revivalist argument is this: natural
rights (that is, individual human rights) are rooted in (Western)
legal and political thought, from Greek philosophy to modern
Western constitutions.5 0
Along with his work on human rights, Lauterpacht became
increasingly interested in the role of international tribunals in
defining international law.5 1  Building on his theory that
international law had no actual lacunae,5 2 only difficult questions
that were still in need of resolution, Lauterpacht argued that the
judicial function of international tribunals would fill the gaps of
international law.
In Lauterpacht, we see the quintessential modernist relying
on reason and a sense of universal rules to order a messy world.
First trying to change-if not end-warfare through legal means,
Lauterpacht and the modernists turned their attention to the
relationship between law and societal values in the form of
human rights.5 3 For Lauterpacht the international judge--and
47 Id. at 584 (internal citations omitted).
48 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 31, at 411.
49 LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 35.
50 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 31, at 392 (citing to HERSCH LAUTERPACHT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 73-93 (1950)).
51 See id. at 411-12.
52 See LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY, supra note 35, at 85-87.
53 See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 31, at 391-92.
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the contemplative rationality of the judge-became of central
importance to the evolution of international law. 54 Each of these
strands-the universality of values, the rationality of society, the
importance of human rights, the constructive role of
international adjudication-is part of the DNA of Father
Drinan's argument as well.
C. The Promise of International Law
Father Drinan's view is similarly holistic, small-c catholic.
His call for treaties and tribunals to make sense of the confusion
concerning religion and politics exhibits a faith in rationality and
in international institutions. If one can say that Lauterpacht's
world-view "relies on the interlocutor's willingness to take for
granted the intrinsic rationality of a morality of sweet
reasonableness, the non-metaphysical doctrine of the golden
middle," 55 then a similar description may apply to Father
Drinan's. As when one reads Lauterpacht, in reading Can God
and Caesar Coexist?, one has a sense that Father Drinan believes
that although there is great injustice in the world that must be
ended, there is also a general progress across societies towards
similar emancipatory goals. In these ways, Father Drinan is
modernist in his tone.
While it is clear that Father Drinan sees international law
as a way to forward the freedom of religion, it is not clear just
how successful he thinks international law will be. Consider the
following passage:
But if the record of the ECHR [on religious freedom issues] is
somewhat disappointing, it must also be recognized that no
instant resolutions of the classic clashes between religion and
government are feasible. In fact, the time may never come
when the demands of government will be consistently required
to yield to the leanings of individuals who are conscientiously
opposed to a law of general application that unintentionally
conflicts with their religious views.56
So, while optimistic, Father Drinan takes care not to be
unrealistic. International law today holds much promise. The
ECHR is building an impressive jurisprudence in human rights,
54 See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 35, at 61-63 (discussing the role of a judge in
the international judicial system).
55 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 31, at 410.
56 DRINAN, supra note 13, at 86-87.
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overall, even if Father Drinan may find its cases in the religious
areas wanting. Its caseload, and that of its Western Hemisphere
analog, the IACHR, is burgeoning.57 There are also attempts at
reforming the sporadically functional United Nations human
rights system. 58  There is reason for some hope that the
international human rights system will increase in effectiveness.
But the years leading to World War I were years of hope in
the promise of international law. The issue is really which
impulse is stronger in today's world, the drive to rationalize and
harmonize or the impulse to ostracize and balkanize? As
Benjamin Barber puts it, this is the struggle of McWorld against
Jihad.59
Father Drinan is coy as to which has the upper hand, but he
sees a way forward in the use of international institutions. The
new stream critics and the rational choice theorists are not so
sure. Whereas Father Drinan (and Lauterpacht) are exponents
of the Enlightenment by way of modernism, the new stream
academics are the intellectual heirs of the Romantics and the
rational choice theorists draw very different lessons from the
Enlightenment than does Father Drinan. We will turn to their
views now as a means to further unpack the relationship of
international law to religious freedom.
57 Regarding the number of cases filed before the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights, see Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Annual Report
2004, http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/chap.3.htm (last visited July 29, 2006)
(illustrating that the total number of complaints received by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights during the last seven years has risen from 458 in
1997 to 1329 in 2004).
58 The most recent attempt at reform culminated in the evolution of the UN's
Human Rights Commission into a new Human Rights Council. See General
Assembly Resolution A/60/251 (April 3, 2006) establishing the Human Rights
Council. See also the Human Rights Council's website, http://www.ohchr.org
english/bodies/hrcouncil. See Benedict Kingsbury, Foreword: Is the Proliferation of
International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 679, 693 (1999) (noting the "perennial" question of reforming the UN human
rights system and citing to Philip Alston, Final Report on Enhancing Long-term
Effectiveness of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty System, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1997/74 (Mar. 7, 1997), as an example of increasing skepticism as to the
possibility of reform).
59 See generally BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 4-20 (1995)
(describing the tensions between Jihad and McWorld). Barber uses the term "jihad"
as shorthand for characteristics "favorable to parochialism, antimodernism,
exclusiveness, and hostility to 'others.'" Id. at 205. Although he uses a term from
Islam, he emphasizes that jihad, in this sense, is "a characteristic of all
fundamentalisms." Id. at 206.
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II. Two CRITIQUES
Robert Drinan and Hersch Lauterpacht share a faith in
humanity's essential rationality. Perhaps more importantly than
being rational, people are generally reasonable. Father Drinan
and Lauterpacht also believe in international law as a project
that is continuously being built and, in the process of
constructing international law, the state system will become
progressively more peaceful and just. This sense of the
rationality of humans and in the ability to perceive universal
rights-as described in international law-is part of the world
view of the European Enlightenment. 60 The reaction against the
Enlightenment was Romanticism, which, as Professor Brian
Tamanaha describes:
[T]he Romantics ... challenged the very coherence and
desirability of universality, and ... the scope of reason,
advocating in their place particularity, will, creativity, and
passion. They glorified cultures as wholes unto themselves,
each with its own unique and incommensurable life world and
values.61
Tamanaha explains that, as the project of the Enlightenment
seemed to be unable to rationalize and universalize society and
its norms, philosophers began rejecting the idea of an ultimate
good.62 But, while the philosophical discourse may have turned
from the Enlightenment to Romantic and critical voices,
international lawyers picked up the thread of the
Enlightenment's story and took it for their own. And today, we
find international law's mainstream with a universalizing project
that is a recognizable offspring of the Enlightenment, whereas
current critical voices share some characteristics of the
Enlightenment and of the Romantics.
The critical voices of particular interest to us are the rational
choice theorists, also called economic behavioralists, and the
critical legal studies or "new stream" theorists.
A. Voltaire's Bastards: The Universalism of Self-Interest
The Enlightenment was the parent of a large, contentious
brood. One result of the Enlightenment was the belief in the
60 See TAMANAHA, supra note 24, at 39-40.
61 Id. at 40.
62 See id. at 41.
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existence of universal rights, rights that apply to all people
regardless of race, color, or creed.63  Another child of the
Enlightenment is rationality. 64 In Father Drinan's project, we see
how a faith in reason is used to foster the protection of universal
rights. 65 But this is not the only way that the Enlightenment's
genetic material may combine; other descendents of the
Enlightenment focus on rationality in the sense of strategic
decision-making to achieve desired results. To the rational
choice theorists, rational decision-making based on self interest
is the true universal constant in humankind. Consequently,
rather than worrying about conceptions of rights, which are
historically and socially contingent, one should focus on the
common strategies that states use to forward their individual
interests.
The result of this exercise is a different sort of universalism
than Father Drinan's, a universalism of technique rather than of
right. Rational choice theorists, such as Eric Posner and Jack
Goldsmith, do not perceive international law as absolute rules
that must be followed by states. 66 In The Limits of International
Law, Posner and Goldsmith, the authors, argue that multilateral
human rights treaties have little influence on state behavior.67
Rather, the enforcement of human rights is based on the
interests of the states involved, regardless of whether
international legal obligations exist. According to Posner and
Goldsmith:
[S]tates that care about human rights.., will pressure human
rights abusers regardless of whether they are signatories to a
treaty or have violated customary international law. When
63 See ISHAY, supra note 26, at 83-84 (explaining the success of the
Enlightenment in influencing the recognition of fundamental human rights in many
international treatises).
64 The role of rationality on policymaking is John Ralston's Saul's quarry in his
book VOLTAIRE'S BASTARDS. See, generally, SAUL, supra note 29, at 5, 7-9.
65 See DRINAN, supra note 13; text accompanying notes 13-15.
66 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 108, 115-17, 119-21, 123-26 (2005) (arguing that human rights treaties have
little influence on human rights practices); in reply to Goldsmith and Posner's
assertions, see, generally, Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of
International Human Rights Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 393 (2006).
67 Id. As for customary international law, rational choice theorists argue that
much of what is claimed by mainstream international lawyers to be state practice
due to a belief in the existence of a legal obligation is nothing more than self-
interested activity. See id. at 109-12.
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conditions are not right, they will tolerate human rights abuses
in other states regardless of whether they are signatories to a
treaty or have violated customary international law. 68
Concerning Father Drinan's project, a rational choice
theorist would first find it telling that the Declaration on
Religious Freedom is only a General Assembly resolution and
that states did not seek to have it become a convention. 69
General Assembly resolutions are the runts of international law's
litter: They are not legally binding in and of themselves and are
only of marginal use in the formation of customary international
law. 70 This is a technique that states use when they want to
have the benefit of making a proclamation but not of the costs of
actually being bound to the declaration. 71 Instead of viewing soft
law as a step to hard law, rational choice theorists are likely to
view the decision to use a non-binding declaration as a lack of
commitment to compliance. 72
With its skepticism about the role of treaties and the
existence of customary international law, rational choice theory
not only clashes with mainstream international law, but
particularly with European conceptions of international law. The
European worldview has been described as being essentially
Kantian: cosmopolitan with a concern for formal legality.73
Martti Koskenniemi situates the U.S. view as being one of
rational choice: "Legalization, is just a policy choice, a matter of
costs and benefits-with no a priori reason to believe that the
latter would outweigh the former." 74 Father Drinan's argument,
68 Id. at 134.
69 See DRINAN, supra note 13, at 20-21.
70 See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 48-50 (Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts eds., Longman 9th ed. 1992), for a discussion concerning General Assembly
resolutions. See also Award on the Merits in Dispute Between Texaco Overseas
Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company and the Government of the
Libyan Arab Republic (Compensation for Nationalized Property), 17 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1, 27-31 (1978).
71 See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
YALE L.J. 1935, 2005-09 (2002). See also Eric A. Posner, The Signaling Model of
Social Norms: Further Thoughts, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 472 (2002), for Eric
Posner's argument that social interaction should be understood as having two
stages: the signaling stage and the cooperation stage.
72 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 66, at 99.
73 See Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition
and Renewal, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 113, 117 (2005).
74 Id. Koskenniemi's brief sketch of the American mindset warrants some
fleshing out. Robert Kagan had astute observations on similar issues in his article
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in this sense, is closer to being "European" than "American": The
protection of human rights is not just a policy choice. Rights
exist; they are real; they are universal.
B. The New Stream: Apologies and Utopias
If the relationship of rational choice theorists to the
mainstream is a battle over two universalisms, then the critique
by the new stream theorists is the resurgence of particularism.
Much in the same way that the Romantics reacted to the
homogenizing proclivities of the Enlightenment philosophes, the
new stream reacts to the universalism of mainstream legal
perspectives by "problematizing" many of the givens of
jurisprudential orthodoxy.
There is no single new stream school; its bibliography is
large and diverse. 75 Third World Approaches to International
Law, or "TWAIL," critiques the Western and developed country
biases of the rules and structures of international law. 76 Latin
American Criticism, or LatCrit, does the same with a particular
emphasis of the culture of the Americas and especially of
indigenous peoples.7 7  Feminist legal theory explains how
Power and Weakness, POLICY REV., No. 113 (June and July 2002), available at
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3460246.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2007). Kagan's argument (in part based on observations of Robert Cooper) is that
Europe represents a "post-modern world" in which there are no traditional security
threats; it is a Kantian paradise. Id. at *15. Europe is inward looking and satisfied
that it has found a set of rules that foster peace and prosperity, at least within
Europe. The tough places in the world-swaths of Africa, the Middle East and
Asia-are definitely outside of this post-modern paradise; they are still mired in the
modern and the pre-modern world of Hobbes. The U.S. has to navigate between
these worlds, maintaining security for the post-modern world by remaining engaged
with the modern and the pre-modern. The U.S. mans the wall but cannot walk
through the gate. Id. Consequently, the U.S. has not incorporated the relatively rigid
legalism of those who live their lives within the post-modern paradise because it
needs flexibility to address the problems emanating from the rest of the world. The
trick, of course, is to move states from the Hobbesian world into the Kantian
paradise.... How to do this, in part, is one of Father Drinan's concerns.
75 Literally. See David Kennedy & Chris Tennant, New Approaches to
International Law: A Bibliography, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 417, 417-21 (1994); see also
Kennedy, supra note 30, at 26; Purvis, supra note 36, at 82.
76 See, e.g., Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94 A.S.I.L. PROC. 31, 31 (2000)
("The regime of international law is illegitimate. It is a predatory system that
legitimizes, reproduces and sustains the plunder and subordination of the Third
World by the West.").
77 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Foreword: LatCrit Goes International, 16 FLA. J.
INT'L L. x, xvi-xx (2004) (discussing recent developments in LatCrit scholarship that
indicate a renewed international focus); cf. Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol, On
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international law favors the interests of men over women. 78 The
origins of new stream theory are similarly varied: legal realism,
anarchism, Satrean existentialism, radical social theory, and
progressive historiography all contributed to new stream
scholarship. 79  Critical theory, linguistic theory, stucturalism,
literary theory, sociology, and normative philosophy are among
the approaches that inform the new stream.80 New stream
writers react to what they view as the lack of self-reflection, the
doctrinal timidity, and the cabined thinking of mainstream
international legal jurisprudence.8 1 They attempt to be reflective
about the discipline of international law,8 2 and unearth its
underlying assumptions, biases, and cognitive structures in an
attempt to "rejuvenate the field as an arena of meaningful
intellectual inquiry."8 3
While the varied perspectives of the new stream would each
have their own set of concerns regarding Father Drinan's
proposal, I will focus on the work of sociological critiques of
international law, of which David Kennedy8 4 and Martti
Koskenniemi 5 are among the most influential scholars.8 6
Becoming the Other: Cubans, Castro, and Elian-A LatCritical Analysis, 78 DENV.
U. L. REV. 687 (2001).
78 See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 379, 381 (1999) (arguing that there are significant power differentials
between men and women in the field of international law, notably, the under-
representation of women in international legal institutions, the gender-biased
vocabulary used, and supposedly gender-neutral constructs that affect men and
women differently).
79 Purvis, supra note 36, at 89.
80 See Kennedy, supra note 30, at 7; Purvis, supra note 36, at 88-89.
81 See Kennedy, supra note 30, at 4-6; Purvis, supra note 36 at 87-89.
82 See Purvis, supra note 36, at 87-89.
83 Kennedy, supra note 30, at 6.
84 For examples of David Kennedy's work on the sociology and history of the
international legal profession, see David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International
Law and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. IN'L L. 9 (1999) [hereinafter Kennedy, Disciplines];
David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and
International Governance, 197 UTAH L. REV. 545 (1997); see also David Kennedy,
Tom Franck and the Manhattan School, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 397 (2003);
David Kennedy, Critical Theory, Structuralism and Contemporary Legal
Scholarship, 21 NEw ENG. L. REV. 209 (1986); David Kennedy, Primitive Legal
Scholarship, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1986).
85 Before The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, Koskenniemi set the mark for critical
perspectives on international law with From Apology to Utopia, which has become
recognized as one of the most significant jurisprudential texts on international law
in the latter half of the twentieth century. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO
UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (Cambridge Univ.
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The sociologists consider the substance of international law
through the optic of the habits, techniques, biases, and blind
spots of the international legal profession.87 Here it is not only
the law, but the lawyers who are "problematized." While
international legal sociologists are not necessarily "crits" or even
identified as part of the new stream, s8 their work animates
contentions shared among many new stream perspectives.
International legal sociology often shows that the very concept of
an international legal profession is fraught with ideological
baggage as to shared projects, methods, and goals. Realizing
that as lawyers, we are more likely to see certain problems and
miss others, as well as a tendency towards certain types of
solutions, we can better assess both how we perceive the world
and how we choose to address its problems.
Professional training, such as law school and legal practice,
"actively socializes people to value certain things above others."8 9
Lawyers, thus, carry "normative biases systematically instilled
by their professional training."90 This world view, which is at
first learned, becomes more deeply instilled as lawyers act to
actually reinforce their understanding of how transnational
litigation and arbitration affects the knowledge, interest, and
expectations of lawyers, judges, and litigants in transitional
societies. By changing these expectations, it plays a part in
forming the norms of the evolving legal system. David Kennedy
observed:
Press 2005) (1989) [hereinafter KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA]; see also
George Rodrigo Bandeira Galindo, Martti Koskenniemi and the Historiographical
Turn in International Law, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 539, 540 (2005); Martti Koskenniemi,
Letter to the Editors of the Symposium, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 351, 355 (1999)
[hereinafter Koskenniemi, Letter to the Editors] (describing a method of analyzing
international law that borrows from French structuralism, social and linguistic
theory, and an analysis of binary oppositions).
86 See also David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of
the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407, 461 (1994).
87 See Kennedy, Disciplines, supra note 84, at 13 ("[I]ndividuals... rush
headlong to establish, embrace, and embellish their discipline's blind spots and
contradictions.").
88 Note, for example, Martti Koskenniemi's ambivalence of being identified as a
"critic" in Koskenniemi, Letter to the Editors, supra note 85, at 351-52.
89 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 905 (1998).
90 Id.
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I have been repeatedly struck by the degree to which
individuals are not blinded by their disciplinary commitments,
but instead rush headlong to establish, embrace, and embellish
their discipline's blind spots and contradictions. Their
disciplinary sensibility is as much about desire, construction,
and work as it is about error or ignorance. As a result, I am
increasingly convinced that a disciplinary sensibility does not
precede the people who occupy it, but is their common project,
made and remade as they pursue the projects of their hearts
and heads. 91
By accepting a discipline's professional habits, blind spots,
and biases, you turn its project into your own. 92 Aspects of the
Enlightenment world view have become pervasive in
international legal argument, if not the method of policymaking
in the West in general. The subtitle to John Ralston Saul's book
on the Enlightenment's effects on modern policy, Voltaire's
Bastards, is The Dictatorship of Reason in the West. 93
International legal argument, according to new stream writers,
"operates within a restricted intellectual structure. '94  That
structure is the result of a political choice and it demonstrates
the existence of bias and "international law's denial or ignorance
of its own structure serves to obscure the existence of that
structure."95 The structure of the discussion, how and what one
says, has been an unexamined given in the scholarship of the
mainstream. Martti Koskenniemi has mused: "I often wonder to
what extent international law is becoming a political theology in
Europe . ,,..96 This law-as-theology defines how we see and
interact with the world. It tells us what the problems are that
need fixing and how to fix them.
One of the key blind spots of the profession has to do with
the relationship of international law and religion.97 There also
91 Kennedy, Disciplines, supra note 84, at 13.
92 Id. "It might be, in other words, that a discipline's blind spots, strategies of
evasion, elision, or forgetfulness might be linked to bias of various sorts." Id. at 12-
13.
93 SAUL, supra note 29.
94 Purvis, supra note 36, at 98. See generally KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO
UTOPIA, supra note 85, at 1 (describing how theory is excluded from the doctrine of
international law); SAUL, supra note 29, at 324 (noting that the "rational" approach
to law can be "dangerously dissociated from the realities of human society").
95 Purvis, supra note 36, at 99.
96 Koskenniemi, supra note 73, at 120.
97 See Kennedy, supra note 30, at 23-24 (discussing the marginalization of
religion in modern international law).
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exists a more general critique concerning the relationship of
religion to the history of international law.98 David Kennedy is
skeptical of the traditional historical narrative in which
Westphalia marked the separation of religion from international
law: "Ironically," he notes, "at the very moment of religion's
disappearance [from the narrative], international law appears as
a universalist ideology of its own-temporally freed from its
origin and context."99 International law, in one sense, took on
many trappings of religion. Religious movements such as the
Reformation also need to be understood as political acts. In
Kennedy's view, international law and the rhetoric of religion
inform and affect each other.
Considering Father Drinan's argument from the perspective
of new stream theorists, two issues immediately come to mind:
First, who has defined this right of religious freedom and is it
actually universal? Second, is the legalistic technique of defining
a right in a treaty and forming a tribunal actually the way to
protect this right (assuming it exists) or is it simply the method
that is most comfortable to an international lawyer?
Considering the first question, the universality of religious
freedom as a human right, new stream writers echo the
Romantic sensibility that cultures are different and should be
respected as such. 100  An attempt to apply one culture's
conception of right and wrong is a source of struggle and
contention; its resolution is decided by the application of power.
New stream authors could look into the drafting history of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and note that Chung-
Shu Lo of China said in the debate at the United Nations that
"[t]he basic ethical concept of Chinese social political relations is
the fulfillment of the duty to one's neighbour, rather than the
claiming of rights."101
98 See id. at 18-19 (examining the "story" of international law's historical
relationship with religion).
99 Id. at 22.
100 See, e.g., Anthony Carty, Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the
Theory of International Law, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 66, 67-68 (1991) (stating that
international lawyers must "resist phony, reified, would-be univeralist legal
discourse" and acknowledge "opposing and self-differentiating national and regional]
continental cultural traditions").
101 CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM
69 (2003).
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This position is not singular to China; other Asian leaders
have noted that the Asian conception of human rights is different
than what has evolved in Western Europe. 10 2 One Chinese
author recently described Asian values as emphasizing
"consensual solutions, communitarianism rather than
individualism, social order and harmony, respect for elders,
discipline, a paternalistic state, and the primary role of
government in economic development." 103 The reason for these
different values is that they are socially and geographically
contingent. Western Europe, with its historically low population
density and non-labor-intensive agriculture, was able to form a
conception of rights that was individualistic.1 04  Asia, with its
high population density and labor-intensive agriculture, evolved
a communitarian conception of rights that would allow for
stability under such conditions. 105 Such theorists might argue,
for example, that it is not that the Chinese or the Malaysians do
not believe in human rights, but that the socio-economic realities
of their societies produce a different conception of rights. In
other words, values are not universal, they are contextual. 10 6
Mainstream authors have a response to this: First and foremost,
they play the "let's be realistic" card right back to the new stream
authors. Arguments against the universality of rights are not
made by the people who are being deprived of those rights, but
rather by the political leaders and economic elites who have a
vested interest in the status quo, just or unjust.10 7  David
102 See TAMANAHA, supra note 24, at 139 (stating that some Asian leaders object
to the application of Western, individualized human rights doctrine to Eastern,
communitarian societies).
103 TOMUSCHAT, supra note 101, at 70.
104 See, e.g., speech by Liu Huaqiu, head of Delegation of the People's Republic
of China to the World Human Rights Conference, June 1993 (quoted by Michael C.
Davis, Human Rights in Asia: China and the Bankok Declaration, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L.
215, 226-27 (1996)) (stating, among other things, "[t]he concept of human rights is a
product of historical development. It is closely associated with specific social,
political and economic conditions and the specific history, culture, and values of a
particular country.").
105 See id. at 67-68 (describing the impact of agriculture on Chinese and Indian
civilizations).
106 See Koskenniemi, supra note 73, at 119 ("[L]aw has no shape of its own, but
always comes to us in the shape of particular traditions or preferences .... ").
i07 See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Some Reflections on Contemporary International
Law and the Appeal to Universal Values: A Response to Martti Koskenniemi, 16 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 131, 131 (2005) (observing that the universality of international law is
currently "under attack from those who, in the name of their assumed unique
position in the world community, aim to weaken the very notion of an international
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Bederman has quipped, "[i]t is ironic that among the values that
compete at the moral-philosophic center of international law,
human rights are most contentiously disputed as being artifacts
either of false universalism or dangerous relativism."1 08
Moreover, as some new stream authors acknowledge, the context-
driven origin of rights does not deny that such rights may
actually be universal.109
Thus, universal values are more than just partisan
preferences. As one Iranian said to French international lawyer
Pierre-Marie Dupuy: "When an Iraqi, Turkish or Afghan
dissident is tortured in prison, he suffers in the same way a
French or British person would in a suburban police station. And
he has as much need as them of Amnesty International's aid!"110
Dupuy reverses the critique that invocations of universal
rights are merely pie-in-the-sky rhetoric. Actually, it may be the
universalists who are causing real change and the critics who are
involved in theological squabbles of great noise and little
consequence: "If the passionate demand for self-scrutiny leads to
paralysis, we should perhaps begin to wonder if we have not gone
too far in our denunciations of those who appeal to the
universal. . . ."I" Martti Koskenniemi recognized this criticism
of the critics in writing: "Skepticism about the material
determinacy of international law seems to prevent new
approaches lawyers from making normative propositions. Such
propositions are, perhaps, understood as matters of political
preference." 112
This is not to say that new stream authors are devoid of
policy proposals. However, a particular outlook as to "what is to
be done" is not the new stream's strength, as Koskenniemi points
out.113 Rather, it is an attention to why actors do what they do or
believe what they believe. They move from this into a dissection
legal order").
108 BEDERMAN, supra note 37, at 123 (2002).
109 See Koskenniemi, supra note 73, at 115.
110 Dupuy, supra note 107, at 135.
111 Id. at 136.
112 Kennedy & Tennant, supra note 75, at 427 (quoting Memorandum No.
371/26 from Martti Koskenniemi on the Essex Conference to the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs of Fin. (October 1993) (translating from the Finnish original)).
113 See id. (stating that the research of new stream authors does not provide
answers to lawyers seeking advice).
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of the interests hidden (or obvious) in certain jurisprudential
constructs.
This leads us to the second issue: whether "legalization" as a
technique is desirable. I will consider this question at length in
Part III, below, but at this point, I want to set out the concern
that new stream authors have with legalistic technique. Just
what are these professional habits and blind-spots mentioned by
David Kennedy, as relevant to this discussion? One habit is the
attempt to move issues from out of the realm of political
negotiation and into one of juridical assessment. This was done,
for example, with disputes over international trade. Prior to and
in the early years of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), trade disputes between countries were resolved by
diplomatic negotiation. 114 To be sure, countries drew on past
experience-precedent-in the negotiation, but the issue would
not be resolved by a technocratic decision as to what was legal or
illegal. Rather, resolution would come about through a
combination of persuasion and power. As the GATT evolved and
more countries became part of the world trading system,
negotiations became less "clubby" and more formal. As they
became more formal, greater use was made of third-parties to
mediate or resolve differences between the countries. Finally, in
the jump from the GATT into the new World Trade Organization,
dispute resolution became formally legalized, with the use of
tribunals, legal briefs, and appeals. In this process, an issue that
had been largely a policy matter, resolved by negotiation, became
a legal matter, resolved by litigation.
With legalization, lawyerly tropes such as balancing tests
and reasonable person standards gain in importance over
political techniques such as mobilizing the public or non-binding
mediation. While such activities still have a place outside of the
tribunal proceeding, they are not (officially) part of the tribunal
process.115
114 The narrative in this paragraph draws from JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R.
RATNER, DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS ACTORS, PROCESS 831 (2d
ed. 2006); see also Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 7-8 (1999).
115 See WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 55-56 (3d ed. 2005),
available at http://events.streamlogics.com/wto/2004/e-doc/understanding-e.pdf
(relating WTO panels to tribunals and describing the dispute settlement system as a
rule-based system where experts "examine the evidence and decide who is right and
who is wrong").
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I will turn back to these concerns momentarily. For the
moment, it is sufficient to note that lawyers solve problems in a
certain way, calling upon a certain set of values and skills
ingrained in the profession. I will discuss the efficacy of these
legal structures and professional habits in addressing religious
freedom worldwide below.
C. Summarizing the Critical Perspectives
Compelling as it is, Father Drinan's world view would be
criticized by both the rational choice theorists and the new
stream scholars. The new stream would find his rhetoric
weighted with the baggage of the Western rationalist project and
his stance as not sufficiently critical of the intellectual tradition
or of the profession in which it is embedded. The rational choice
theorists would find his faith in treaties and transnational
unwarranted. According to them, while Father Drinan argues
for a normative prescription, he has not adequately accounted for
how states actually act.
The response of Father Drinan and other mainstream
scholars to the rational choice theorists may be that states, even
if they almost always act out of self-interest, will change the
calculation of costs and benefits with the existence of law and a
tribunal. Much in the same way that people tend to speed if they
do not think they will be caught, once enforcement becomes at
least more possible (is there a police officer with a radar gun
down the road?) then the risk analysis changes and compliance
becomes more probable.
Moreover, even if decisions of a tribunal are not enforced,
there is still a benefit. For Father Drinan, the lack of
enforcement is, important, but does not eradicate the value of
such a tribunal:
Some observers will wonder whether a judgment favoring a
claimant would be worthwhile. After all, the existing
government might not enforce it, or it might receive little
publicity and thereby only harm the situation of the aggrieved
party. But at least a voice of protest would have been heard and
a complaint processed. One important moral justification for
creating human rights tribunals is simply that they might
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prevent any recurrence of the situation in which Europe's Jews
had no place to go to complain. 116
Both the new stream scholars and the rational choice
theorists have some salient points regarding Father Drinan's
analysis. But then again, Father Drinan-and others who use
mainstream or classic modes of international legal argument-
have a stance with much appeal because he maintains a
consistent world view of the good as opposed to merely a
consistent critique of practices or a rule for strategic decision-
making. Father Drinan contends that, in the end, you have to
stand up for some conception of the good. He has his; he explains
what it is, and he sets his sights on that spot. He then starts
traveling the road to get to that place.
While the new stream writers may lack a coherent vision as
to how the international system should be ordered and how to get
there from here, new stream theories, especially sociological and
historiographic theories of the international legal profession,
have led to a better understanding of how and why international
lawyers do what they do. These critiques may not show a specific
way forward, but they do highlight the pitfalls in Father Drinan's
path.
III. BETWEEN FAITH AND REASON: RECONSIDERING THE LIMITS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TRIBUNALS IN RESOLVING
CONFLICTS OVER RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Drawing from new stream theory and rational choice
perspectives, as well as mainstream international legal theory,
one finds that efforts to use international law to protect freedom
of religion face serious obstacles. First, there is the question of
universality and particularity: How will universal laws interact
with contrary domestic norms? Second is the question of
whether legalization is a step towards a solution or a
contributing factor to the conflict. Finally, in a preliminary
attempt to map a way forward, I will briefly consider the
perspectives of legitimacy theory and transnational legal process.
A. Domestic Norms and International Law
How one chooses to worship-or not worship-is often an
issue of great personal import. Believers want to express their
116 DRINAN, supra note 13, at 106.
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devotion in the manner they want; non-believers want to be free
from having to participate in worship. Father Drinan sees this
as a key reason to internationalize the protection of freedom of
religion: It is a core human value that deserves the utmost
respect. 117 Yet, because religious expression (or the freedom from
religious expression) is so important to so many, it also excites
passionate-and perhaps irrational-responses. Father Drinan
recognizes this as well. Asking why some rights are protected
through tribunals or similar institutions and others not, he
answers that:
There is no good answer to that question except that the leaders
of the United Nations have for many years concluded or
assumed that religion is too volatile, controversial, or
unmanageable to be controlled by some global entity.
Underlying this theory is some abiding hostility toward religion
as a cause of political violence and even war.118
While the Romantics of a previous era may have argued that
all cultures were unique and thus one culture's norms should not
be applied to another culture's, the argument here is less
normative and more empirical: Religion is so closely held-it is so
intrinsic to the identities of both societies and individuals-that
the disputes that arise from clashing conceptions of the good
cannot be managed by an transnational tribunal.
Let us consider what may be the hardest case: the ability of
such a treaty and tribunal to promote religious freedom within
predominantly Muslim countries. Father Drinan notes that "one
has to wonder if any worldwide juridical authority could define
and apply international principles of religious freedom to the
Muslim world; or, more pointedly, if the rulings of such a
tribunal could ever win acceptance in the world of Islam-some
fifty nations and 1.2 billion adherents."'19  Only the European
tribunals-that are, as I will argue below, unique due to the high
degree of federalization among the European states and the
relative similarities of their societies-have dared to broach these
topics.
117 See id. at 226 (stating that "[riespect for religious freedom seems to be
instinctual, deep, and powerful").
118 Id. at 41-42.
119 Id. at 181.
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There is a "virtual inseparability of Islam and the culture
that is both its cause and its effect."120  Consequently,
predominantly Islamic societies have shown hostility towards the
transplantation of norms that are considered foreign. 121 This
makes it especially difficult for law as defined by a treaty and
interpreted by an international tribunal to overcome deeply
rooted norms that are intertwined in the very structure of a
society. Some Muslim nations have reserved the right not to be
ruled by international law, and that shari'a will always have
precedence.122
International norms concerning religious freedom have not
been welcomed in certain Muslim countries. Writing about
religious freedom and Islamic states, Christian Tomuschat
observes that:
Article 18 [of the ICCPR] distances itself from the UDHR by
introducing ambiguous language. It provides that the right to
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion "shall include
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice."
This phrase can be interpreted in different ways and has in fact
been subjected to such divergent interpretations. 123
Moreover, Article 1 of the Religious Freedom Declaration
specifies that:
[F]reedom of religion "shall include freedom to have a religion or
whatever belief of his choice." The representatives from Islamic
states made it unequivocally clear in the debate preceding the
vote that this provision was by no means intended to confer a
right to change one's religion. 124
This can be a serious problem because at issue is not simply
what the "black letter" law says, but rather how the society acts
in regards to religious freedom. A government may pay lip
service to religious freedom but, if your neighbors view you with
hostility, then your freedom of religion is in name only.
120 Id.
121 See BARBER, supra note 59, at 206-07.
122 See DRINAN, supra note 13, at 182. Although Westerners may react critically
to the decision by Muslim nations that the Shari'a cannot be superseded by
international law, the result is not very different from U.S. decision that, in internal
matters, the Constitution trumps international law.
123 TOMUSCHAT, supra note 101, at 73.
124 Id. at 73-74; see also DRINAN, supra note 13, at 184 (noting Islam's
reluctance "to accept the right to change one's religion").
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Consequently, as Rosa Brooks has written, "creating the rule of
law is most fundamentally an issue of norm creation." 125
B. Would a Transnational Tribunal on Religious Freedom be
Part of the Answer or Part of the Problem?
Would an international tribunal assist in the evolution of
domestic norms or in combating religious intolerance around the
world or might it exacerbate the situation by stoking fears of
"Western imperialism"? International tribunals are a peculiarly
Western technique to address issues ranging from disagreements
between countries to, in this case, norms within countries. In the
years prior to World War I, when European countries tried to
curb armed conflict through legalistic techniques, Britain and the
United States, in particular, signed a host of bilateral
international arbitral agreements to resolve inter-state disputes,
showing the Anglo-American proclivity to using quasi-litigation
to resolve disputes. 126
International tribunals and courts have proliferated since
the end of the Second World War in a variety of issue areas. 27 In
the 1960s and 1970s investor-state dispute resolution, as
ensconced in bilateral investment treaties, was used to resolve
125 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the
"Rule of Law," 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2285 (2003). Brooks contrasts the role of
norms in a society versus that of law. See id. at 2321-28.
126 See GREWE, supra note 30, at 611.
127 The 1990's saw the establishment of, among other tribunals, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Understanding and the World
Bank Inspection Panel. There has also been a trend towards increasing use of
international tribunals and courts in general. Thus, we find not only more tribunals,
but, generally, increasing use of each tribunal and consequently a significant
expansion of international case law. See Jonathan I. Charney, The Impact on the
International Legal System of the Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697, 697-98 (1999) (discussing the development of
international courts and tribunals over the course of the twentieth century);
Developments in International Criminal Law: Foreword, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1
(1999) (discussing the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda in recent
years). See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened by
Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 RECUIEL DES COURS 101 (1998); Cesare P.R.
Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle,
31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709, 715-17 (1999) (listing organizations that are
classified as judicial bodies).
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disagreements over expropriations and nationalizations. 128 In
the 1990s the Western powers feared the effects of rampant
nationalism and wanted to stem secessionists and genocidaires
and so built tribunals to address the situations in Rwanda and
Yugoslavia. 129  This was further expanded with a standing
International Criminal Court. 130 Now, in an era of a concern over
a "clash of civilizations" where U.S. troops combat Islamists in
battlefields large and small around the globe, where Muslim
youth have shown their frustration for being treated as second
class citizens in France and throughout Europe, and as questions
of cultural assimilation and integration become heated topics in
many industrialized countries, Western democracies have
become particularly anxious over religious and ethnic tensions.
It is understandable that one of the first reactions of mainstream
international lawyers would be to turn to the lawyerly techniques
of codification, in the form of treaty making, and judicialization,
in the form of constructing an international tribunal.
Keeping in mind that "[t]he thesis of [Father Drinan's] book
[is] that religious freedom has been elevated to the status of
customary international law, and therefore its observance should
be monitored and supervised like other basic rights of a political
nature,"' 31 we should consider the mechanisms for the
monitoring and enforcement of human rights and whether they
are counterproductive in this case. The ICCPR, the Convention
Against Torture, and other human rights treaties have
monitoring committees that receive periodic reports regarding
the human rights practices on member states in the given topic
area. While monitoring groups are unable to directly enforce
violations, they can muster political and moral opprobrium.
128 See, e.g., RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES xii (1995); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral
Investment Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 621 (1998).
129 Regarding the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), see Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, adopted by Res. 827 (May 25, 1993), available at http://www.un.orgl
icty/legaldoc-ebasic/statut/statute-feb06-e.pdf [hereinafter ICTY]; Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1958.
130 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 5-6, July 17,
1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1003-04 (1998) (defining genocide and listing it as one of the
four crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction).
131 DRINAN, supra note 13, at 185.
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1. The Effectiveness of Tribunals
Tribunals, by contrast, may be able to actually award
damages or prospective relief.13 2 Third-party dispute resolution
for human rights is scattered among a variety of courts and
quasi-judicial institutions with either global or regional
purview. 133 Father Drinan tends to cite to cases from the ECHR,
probably the most successful of human rights dispute resolution
mechanisms. 134 The structure of the European system is more
focused on the individual complaint process rather than other
regional or global human rights dispute settlement mechanisms.
Whereas the ICCPR has an optional individual complaint
mechanism, the European Convention requires accession to the
individual complaint mechanism. 135 Unlike the Inter-American
System, which uses two tiers, 136 the European system replaced
the pre-existing Court and Commission structure (as is currently
the case of the Inter-American system) with a single Court. 137
Individual complaints, as a result, are heard in the first instance
by a body that can order binding measures, as opposed to only
issuing a report. 138 Besides being able to require prospective
relief in the form of amelioration of domestic law and policy, the
ECHR is also able to order compensation for the plaintiff. 39
132 Concerning compensatory damages, see DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 214, et seq. (1999).
133 Id. at 14-15.
134 See, e.g., DRINAN, supra note 13, at 159 (citing the 1993 case Kokkinakis v.
Greece, the first claim on religion heard by the ECHR).
135 See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 2, (Dec. 16, 1966), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3fb/a-opt.htm.
136 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/
index-ing.html (last visited Jul. 27, 2006); Organization of American States,
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicoslbasic3.htm [hereinafter Inter-
American Convention] (concerning the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights).
137 Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 1, 1998, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html; see also European Court of Human Rights,
http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/ECHR.html (last visited Jul. 27, 2006).
138 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 1, 1998, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 46, available at http://www.hri.org/
docs/ECHR50.html.
139 Id. art. 41.
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Thus, all tribunals are not created equal. 140 The individual
complaint mechanisms in United Nations human rights
mechanisms are weak due to a lack of money damages, a lack of
credible enforcement, complaint mechanisms are not mandatory,
and politicization of the reporting process. While the ECHR and
the TACHR have certain strengths relative to the United Nations
system, the European experience is still an outlier point.
Furthermore, while the ECHR is perhaps the most successful of
human rights tribunals, it is not a helpful analogy when
designing a global tribunal on religious rights.
For one thing, Europe is relatively homogenous when
compared to the international system as a whole. However,
Father Drinan takes a view of Europe's history that
overemphasizes earlier conflicts.141 Such an emphasis of early
conflict makes a generalization of the European into the
international seems like less of a stretch. But as Father Drinan
notes, "one must remember that the court was designed to
adjudicate cases arising in countries with common cultures and,
in general, a deep respect for understanding differences in
religious background."142 The importance of this deep cultural
similarity, the common norms of today's Europe, cannot be
underestimated when we are analyzing the efficacy of a tribunal
adjudicating conceptions of human rights.
140 How to accurately assess the "effectiveness" of international and
transnational tribunals, and the result of those assessments, are hotly-debated
issues. Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter set the standard with their 1997
article, which set out thirteen variables for effectiveness. See Laurence R. Helfer &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,
107 YALE L.J. 273, 300-37 (1997). John Yoo & Eric Posner have criticized Helfer and
Slaughter's analysis focusing in particular on whether political dependence is
favorable of independence for international tribunals. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo,
Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV 1 (2005); see also
Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International
Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005); Eric
A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Reply to Helfer and Slaughter, 93 CAL. L. REV. 957 (2005).
141 In Father Drinan's view:
Many of the ECHR's rulings may seem routine, but it must be remembered
that they are being issued on a continent where minority groups have been
persecuted for their religions since before the time of the Roman Empire.
Heretics and nonbelievers were commonly subjected to torture and the
most painful deaths that ingenuity could devise. The Crusades, the
Inquisition, and the Holocaust are part of the collective memory of Europe.
Id. at 88-89.
142 Id. at 90.
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Besides normative and cultural affinities, high levels of
European political and legal integration, both among the
countries of the EU and between the EU institutions and those of
its member States, has led to a robust normative interaction.
The ECHR, though not an EU institution, benefits from this. In
the EU, the nations of Europe have the deepest pooling of
sovereignty of any international organization, such that the EU
may be closer to a proto-state than simply a regional
arrangement. This institutional depth-including a parliament,
administrative agencies, ministerial councils, as well as courts-
gives a sizable advantage to the normative weight of the ECHR.
The other institutions of the EU have socialized the general
publics and the elite decision-makers to be accustomed to
interplay between domestic and international institutions. One
can say that the history of Europe since World War II is largely a
story of increasing reliance on, and comfort with, regional and
other international institutions. The rise of European economic
power and the securing of the European peace can be crafted as
the story of the evolution from the European Coal and Steel
Community to the European Union. Economic benefits
were a major driving force behind Europe's deepening
institutionalization and it provided an important incentive.
Regardless as to whether such a narrative would tell the whole
story (it does not; more on that below), it nonetheless is a story
that engenders a respect for international institutions.
As a result of this history of integration, the ECHR can rely
not only on the normative commonality of Europe, but on
domestic institutions that are open to the concept of normative
interpretation from international institutions. Consequently, the
ECHR "has begun to see its rulings change the shape of domestic
law, through legislative revision and administrative decree as
well as judicial decision."143
Such integration is unique. The IACHR, perhaps the next
most robust human rights tribunal, nonetheless stands in
contrast to the European experience. Lacking the institutional
interplay that the ECHR has with domestic courts, there have
been relatively few cases before the IACHR and "almost no
incorporation of those cases in national jurisprudence." 144 The
143 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1108, 1109
(2000).
144 Holly Dawn Jarmul, Note, The Effect of Decisions of Regional Human Rights
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track records of human rights adjudication only worsens from
there. In the regions that are the most religiously diverse, Africa
and Asia, there is either no human rights enforcement
mechanism (Asia) or one in the early stages of construction
(Africa). 145
These observations show us that relatively homogenous and
politically integrated groups of people tend to have more effective
human rights dispute resolution mechanisms. The ECHR is far
at one end of the spectrum of effectiveness. It is followed by the
IACHR, covering the slightly less homogenous culture of the
Americas. Keep in mind that the U.S. has not submitted to the
jurisdiction of the IACHR, thus the Inter-American Court largely
settles human rights disputes arising out of the culturally similar
states of Latin America.146 Africa may provide the most
interesting experiment given its large Muslim, Christian, and
animist populations, but its human rights court is, as of this
writing, being re-designed and is as yet untested. 147 Asia, with
significant populations of Muslims, Christians, Hindus,
Buddhists, as well as states hostile to religion, such as China,
does not have a binding human rights court.148 And such is the
case in the international system overall.
Unfortunately, the ECHR is an outlier point rather than a
generalizable case. Other regions, and the international system
as a whole, are more fractious and less integrated than Europe.
Most obviously and most importantly, the normative disparity is
broad. Also, while the EU was knit together by mutual economic
interest which allowed for normative disagreements to be
Tribunals on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 311, 324 (1996). But see
id. at 324-28 (noting the special case of Argentina and the "power of publicity").
145 Concerning the African Court of Human Rights, see GEORGE WILLIAM
MUGWANYA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 45-49 (2003) (tracing the history of the
African System); The Project on International Courts and Tribunals, African Court
of Human and Peoples' Rights, http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/ACHPR.html (last
visited July 19, 1006); see also The Protocol to the African Charter of Human and
Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples'
Rights, Oct. 6, 1998, http://www.africa-union.org/rule-prot/africancourt-
humanrights.pdf. Concerning the lack of a system in Asia, see MUGWANYA, supra, at
49-50.
146 See Jarmul, supra note 144, at 312, nn. 5 & 6 (naming Latin American
countries that have signed the convention and noting that the United States has
declined to participate).
147 See MUGWANYA, supra note 145, at 45-49; TOMUSCHAT, supra note 101, at
214.
148 TOMUSCHAT, supra note 101, at 33-34.
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subsumed by the greater (economic) good, there is no such
economic incentive assisting in the construction of global human
rights institutions such as a religious rights tribunal. Under
such circumstances, the prospects of a global court for perhaps
the most contentious of human rights-freedom of religion-are
not heartening.
But difficulty is not impossibility and the stakes are high.
Father Drinan argues that "[t]o concede that religious human
rights are not enforceable in some countries would lessen the
importance of all human rights in the covenants of the United
Nations." 149
2. Would a Tribunal on Religious Freedom be
Counterproductive?
While Father Drinan is correct in saying that we would
never want to just throw our hands in the air and say that
certain human rights are unenforceable in certain countries, we
should at least pause and consider whether attempting to
establish an international tribunal is the path we want to follow.
Consider economic, social, and cultural rights in comparison to
civil and political rights. While there is a complaint
mechanism-however weak-in the ICCPR, despite current
considerations by the United Nations, the International
Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ("ICESR"), as
of yet, does not have any individual complaint procedure.
150
Michael Dennis and David Stewart-both of whom are involved
in the human rights field-argue that, far from ensuring the
protection of economic, social, and cultural rights, "the proposed
individual-complaints procedure would improvidently 'legalize'
the content and provision of ... [these] rights ... [and] there are
other, more promising pathways to realizing the promises and
visions embodied in the UDHR and the ICESCR." 151  They
conclude that "[t]he call for formal, binding, case-by-case
adjudication seems to us an example of overreaching legal
positivism, borne of the myth that judicial or quasi-judicial
149 DRINAN, supra note 13, at 185.
150 See Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic Social,
and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to
Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 462,
462 (2004).
15, Id. at 466.
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processes intrinsically produce better, more insightful policy
choices than, for example, their legislative counterparts."' 152 The
protection of human rights is at times set back by over-
judicialization, when what is needed is a diplomatic solution.
One difficult problem for the tribunal would be separating
what is or is not part of a core religious practice. Peyote for
American Indians? Marijuana for Rastafarians? Polygamy for
non-mainline Mormons? Father Drinan considers an example
relating to the treatment of women in Islamic societies. 153 A
court may condemn some acts as human rights violations but
those acts may be required-or at least allowed-by that
community's religion. 154 In a hypothetical suit by aggrieved
women, can a transnational court be asked to weigh human
rights law versus a particular community's interpretation of
religious rights and obligations when such a court is outside of
the relevant community of faith? Could the resolution of such a
conflict be possible through another forum, such as a domestic
legislature or court?
By using legal mechanisms that give the illusion of
universality of norms, we paper over large gaps. Even worse, we
start to believe that there is consensus where there is conflict.
The very act of "papering over"-of drafting universal
declarations, covenants, and the like-is resented by people who
prefer the particular. "Religious freedom" and "freedom of
conscience" are concepts that are difficult to square across the
Wahabis of Saudi Arabia, the factions of Northern Ireland, the
Shi'a regime of Iran, and many Christian Conservatives, to name
a few.
Attempts to universalize norms tend to bring a resurgence of
particularity. As Benjamin Barber would put it, McWorld fosters
Jihad. 155 Even in the EU, which I described as being relatively
homogenous and highly integrated, efforts at universality cause
backlash. "The more 'Europe' hoves into view, the more reluctant
and self-aware its national constituents become."' 56  This is
152 Id.
153 See DRINAN, supra note 13, at 135.
154 See, e.g., id. at 143, 148 (discussing the practice female genital mutilation,
which is accepted by Islam and in some African nations, but is rejected elsewhere in
the world as a violation of human rights).
155 See BARBER, supra note 59, at 5 ("McWorld not only imperils but re-creates
and reinforces Jihad.").
156 Id. at 11.
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exemplified not only by the ethnic cleansing by Milosevic's Serbs
but by the French "Non" to the EU Constitution. 157 Each was
driven (at least in part) by a fear or hatred of the "Other," a
rejection of being told by people from outside their community to
accept into their community those who are not like them.
While tolerance is a virtue, I doubt that it is innate. We are
motivated by our differences: in how we look, how we speak,
whom we love, and if and how we praise. These are the deepest
roots of our conceptions of who we are. Father Drinan sees this
as well, although with a note of optimism, he states: "Catholics,
and possibly all believers, seem tribalistically to show rivalry and
antagonism toward groups with other beliefs-feelings that can
quickly grow into astonishingly bitter hostility. Such outbreaks
of rancor have decreased remarkably since Vatican II . . . ."158
While Vatican II may have decreased the spite between Catholics
and other groups, religious based violence as a global
phenomenon has been surging. 159
In societies transformed by the European Enlightenment,
the law often challenges our preconceptions of the way things
work. Law repeatedly gives us Copernican moments, forcing us
to realize that we are not the center of the universe. It brings
different looking people into our schools and allows people to
work where they could not. It forces us to realize that others-
besides those who look, sound, pray, and act like us-are owed
the same opportunity to thrive that we have had.
In the domestic politics of the United States this has been a
long and hard reckoning requiring the engagement of Presidents,
Congress, the courts, and a multitude of citizens over successive
generations. The project of inclusion is not over, even given the
sizable, though sporadic, commitment of our society and
government.
157 See, e.g., Don Singleton, 'Butcher' is Dead. Milosevic dies in jail amid war
trial, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 12, 2006, at 8 ('"Milosevic was accused of orchestrating a
brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing against non-Serbs during the collapse of the
Yogoslav federation .. "); George F. Will, Editorial, French Rejects EU's
Constitution, Elites, THE AUGUSTA CHRON., June 2, 2005, at A4 (noting with regard
to the French rejection of the EU Constitution, "[t]he cognitive dissonance of the
French is striking: They wish to lead a Europe from which they are effectively
insulated.").
158 DRINAN, supra note 13, at 110.
159 See Katie Avon Miller, C of C Course Looks at Bias and Religious Violence,
THE POST & COURIER, Feb. 20, 2005, at 3F (recognizing that worldwide religious
violence is increasing).
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Absent effective enforcement mechanisms, international
law's task is even more difficult. Law takes a long time to seep
down to deep rooted norms. Rather than the short (or long)
sharp shock of change in domestic legal reform, international law
acculturates domestic behavior through repeated reference to
international norms via the interactions between domestic and
international institutions or actors.160 Countries that adhere to
international norms may be rewarded; those that transgress the
norms may be sanctioned.
Although enforcement by tribunal is a technique that
international lawyers have often used to solve problems, here
there is a concern that an imposed standard and an outside
tribunal may actually exacerbate the situation. At best, states,
as rational actors, may sign a treaty for short-term gain in
reputation and then make no effort to comply, assuming that
enforcement by international human rights tribunals is rarely
efficient or effective. In light of this, Father Drinan writes:
Most people would agree that a nation has the right to resist
international norms that go directly against a fundamental
aspect of a national religion. But does this mean that a small
group, or even a large majority, in control of a nation has a right
to follow religious practices directly forbidden by global
standard that arguably rise to the level of customary
international law? The answer has to be yes. 161
Any tribunal facing such deep conviction "would have an
impossibly heavy burden of proof."162 Rather, he considers that
perhaps a monitoring body, similar to the Committee against
Torture, could track compliance with world norms regarding
religious norms on religious freedom. 163 While much of Father
Drinan's focus is on building a means of enforcing rights, he
implicitly accepts that judicialization may not be the best
technique to resolve this problem or that, at least, more than one
technique is necessary. And, while there is no final answer to the
dilemma of an international tribunal being irrelevant at best to
counter-productive at worst, a sketch of a further research may
be made from insights gleaned from legitimacy theory and the
theory of transnational legal process.
160 See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
161 DRINAN, supra note 13, at 183.
162 Id.
163 See id.
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C. Belief, Legitimacy, and the Process of Compliance
The interpretation that foreign judges sitting on an
international tribunal may give to a Covenant on Religious
Freedom may be profoundly at odds with any number of norms in
any number of societies. We have already touched upon regional
conceptions of rights, such as the "Asian values" debate. There
are also differences between religious traditions, such as the
concerns currently in the news regarding Muslims and
Christians. There is also the question of how fundamentalists
from different faiths would react to such a tribunal. This leads to
concern that some of the most religious states would be least
interested in universalist norms and a global tribunal to resolve
disputes concerning religious freedoms. Conversely, secular
societies could fear that a tribunal on religious freedom may find
that a greater degree of religious speech or expression should be
allowed. 164
Besides having to encompass a wide variety of traditions,
such a tribunal may be faced with a diverse set of issues. There
are numerous potential lawsuits that may bridge the topics of
religious freedom and women's rights, such as disputes over
abortion or polygamy. 16 5 Father Drinan noted that a vexing
question may be whether freedom of religion should favor a right
to proselytize or right to "privacy" from proselytization.
Under such circumstances, it is impossible that any given
state or religious group will agree with all of a tribunal's
decisions. It is even questionable whether most people would
agree with the substance of many of the tribunal's decisions. If
that is in fact the case, then such a tribunal may be untenable.
Yet, other tribunals have faced the problem of making many
unpopular decisions. According to legitimacy theory, they were
nonetheless effective if the process by which they came to their
decision was considered "legitimate."
1. Unpopular Rules and Right Process
Using legitimacy theory, one focuses less on the specific
substance of the results of the tribunals, but rather on the
164 See DRINAN, supra note 13, at 119 (describing the possible effect-of a tribunal
on "nonbelievers").
165 See id. at 134-48 (explaining how a tribunal could impact women's rights
and the legality of abortion).
TRIPTYCH
process by which the result was achieved. Thomas Franck,
whose book, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, is the
seminal text of legitimacy theory, wrote that "[l]egitimacy is a
property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a
pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because
those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into
being and operates in accordance with generally accepted
principles of right process."166
There are two instances where procedural fairness and right
process are needed for Father Drinan's proposal to work. First,
the process of making the Covenant on Religious Freedom will
need to be legitimate. But what should happen if many states
choose to apply reservations to key clauses, such as, for example,
a clause guaranteeing the right to convert or a clause allowing
the dissemination of religious materials? If a treaty on religious
freedom would only be perceived legitimate by these states if it
allowed reservations to be applied to such clauses, then it may be
that there is too much normative difference among the potential
signatories for a meaningful Covenant on Religious Freedom to
be effectively applied at the global level.
Besides the legitimacy of the treaty, the actual dispute
resolution process must be legitimate. Given the aversion to
litigious dispute resolution in many Asian societies, there may be
little interest in being forced into litigation over norms that are
particularly closely held. Consequently, designing alternate fora
of mediation may be able to make the institution as a whole gain
in legitimacy and, consequently, efficacy.
Absent clear legitimacy from the outset, what is left is a
constant give-and-take between a tribunal and states that regard
it askance and are reticent to enforce its decisions. Nonetheless,
ongoing interaction can be transformative under certain
circumstances. For this, we consider the theory of transnational
legal process.
2. The Process of Normative Change
Father Drinan argues that it is better to have a tribunal on
religious freedom because, at least, there would be a forum to
166 THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990); see
also THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 26-27 (1995)
(discussing legitimacy as a component of fairness).
2006]
52 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:11
protest injustices, even if the rules were not ultimately applied.167
Transnational legal process, as elucidated by Harold Koh, tells us
that repeated interaction between domestic constituencies and
transnational tribunals can affect domestic norms and law. 168
Koh defines transnational legal process:
[It is] the process whereby an international law rule is
interpreted through the interaction of transnational actors in a
variety of law-declaring fora, then internalized into a nation's
domestic legal system. Through this three-part process of
interaction, interpretation, and internalization, international
legal rules become integrated into national law and
assume the status of internally binding domestic legal
obligations .... Instead of focusing exclusively on the issues of
"horizontal jawboning" at the state-t0-state level as traditional
international legal process theories do, a transnational legal
process approach focuses more broadly upon the mechanisms of
"vertical domestication," whereby international law norms
"trickle down" and become incorporated in domestic legal
systems. 169
Koh posits "four kinds of relationships between rules and
conduct: coincidence, conformity, compliance, and obedience." 170
To use a common example, at times we act in a particular way,
perhaps driving no more than fifty-five miles per hour on a
particular stretch of road, and by coincidence, such behavior is
the same as what is required by law. Other times, we conform
our behavior to the legal norm when others are watching; when
they are not watching we may start speeding, if we feel like it.
Beyond that, one may comply with a rule, even when others are
not watching, because of some secondary benefit that has nothing
to do with legality or illegality; perhaps our car is more fuel
efficient when driven below fifty-five miles per hour. Finally, one
may choose to obey a norm because he has internalized it and
believes it is correct.
As Koh explains: "[I]nstitutional habits soon lead nations
into default patterns of compliance. These patterns act like
167 See DRINAN, supra note 13, at 106.
168 See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International
Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 635-42 (1998) (providing examples of the
transnational legal process of domesticating international norms).
169 Id. at 625-26 (internal citations omitted).
170 Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74
IND. L.J. 1397, 1400 (1999).
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riverbeds, which channel conduct along compliant pathways.
When a nation deviates from that pattern of presumptive
compliance, frictions are created."'171  Signing a treaty and
agreeing to the jurisdiction of a tribunal thus leads to certain
expectations. If one deviates from those expectations, there can
be diplomatic repercussions. Nevertheless, that is not the key to
transnational legal process; the heart of the theory is that states
begin to comply not out of fear of retaliation or repercussions, but
because they internalize the rule. Transnational legal process
thus posits four phases in the transfer of a norm from the
international level to the national: interaction, interpretation,
internalization, and obedience. 172
Transnational legal process can play an important part
regarding Father Drinan's proposal as it opens the possibility
that even if a tribunal is not embraced uniformly within a state,
the fact that it allows for individual rights of action can push the
government into a series of interactions with the tribunal
concerning compliance with international norms. The hope is
that this would cause a process of interpretation and
internalization and ultimately obedience. As I have written
elsewhere, 173 the success of transnational legal process in
transmitting norms from the international level to the domestic
level is contingent on whether the tribunal has a domestic
constituency who is able to effectively press the government for
legal change. 174 Whereas transnational tribunals dealing with
international investment often have constituencies comprised of
elite lawyers and judges who hope to become involved in
international investment arbitration, human rights norms tend
to transmit norms bottom up, through increased use of claims in
grass roots litigation spurring change in the method of
governance within a state. 175 While grass roots transnational
litigation, especially where the transnational tribunal interacts
with domestic courts, can lead to an increased legitimacy of the
tribunal due to its widespread usage, 176 grass-roots litigation may
171 Id. at 1411.
172 See id. at 1414 (describing the four phases of the transnational legal
process).
173 See Borgen, supra note 22, at Part IV D 3.
174 See Helfer & Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A
Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, supra note 140, at 907-08.
175 See Borgen, supra note 22.
176 See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International
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also be relatively slow and uncertain compared to elite-led efforts
at legal reform.177 In the case of norms of religious freedom, it is
unclear whether a politically significant number of people even
want these norms to be transmitted into their domestic legal
cultures. This may be true in some countries that are especially
restrictive of religious freedom.
CONCLUSION
Father Drinan proposes using the tools of universalism to
protect the particular. Nevertheless, using tools such as
transnational courts, which were formed by the international
legal project that evolved from Enlightenment, to resolve
sectarian disputes within a political community risk exacerbating
these conflicts. Using a transnational tribunal that applies
international law to protect religious freedom will force a specific
conception of that right; some things will be allowed whereas
others prohibited, and that decision will be made in a tribunal
sitting far from where many of the disputes may arise.
Such a tribunal is likely to be viewed not as protecting
religious freedom in general but rather a specific conception of
religion; it may be perceived as an attempt to impose a
conception of the good upon populations that have different
beliefs. The irony is that this fear may be equally strong in
theocratic Muslim countries and secular European states-each
may fear that the specific balance it has struck between
Economic Law---Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-
Economic Areas, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 189, 220 (1999), stating
The close interaction between national and European constitutional law,
especially the strong influence of the European Convention on Human
Rights on the interpretation of EC law and the "direct applicability" of EC
guarantees of freedom and non-discrimination by private litigants and
national courts, has provided EC law with a legal dynamic and democratic
legitimacy which United Nations law has never achieved.
Id. at 219.
177 See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 89, at 910, stating
[E]mpirical research on transnational norm entrepreneurs makes it
abundantly clear that these actors are extremely rational and, indeed, very
sophisticated in their means-ends calculations about how to achieve their
goals. They engage in something we would call "strategic social
construction:" these actors are making detailed means-ends calculations to
maximize their utilities, but the utilities they want to maximize involve
changing the other players' utility functions in ways that reflect the
normative commitments of the norm entrepreneurs.
TRIPTYCH
individual rights and societal norms will be upset. In this way
the supposed universal right is interpreted by the populations as
simply another particular conception of the good, one which is
being imposed by a foreign institution. If this is the sum of the
interaction between the transnational tribunal and domestic
society, then there is little hope of success.
Insights from the theory of transnational legal process may
be of use, however. The ongoing interaction and dialogue caused
by such a tribunal may foster normative change within societies.
Yet, this would still require a domestic constituency to take up
the banner of the tribunal and it remains to be seen whether
such a constituency exists and how effective it would be in
bridging the gap between transnational litigation and domestic
practice. Absent the political and socio-economic integration and
convergence between countries that makes the ECHR so
successful, a transnational tribunal requires domestic standard-
bearers who can argue effectively that the interpretations of such
a tribunal must be respected. Whether such a constituency
exists in this case is an empirical question that warrants further
study.
New stream and rational choice perspectives present not
only the problems of Father Drinan's proposal, but with the
addition of transnational legal process and legitimacy,
suggestions as to possible paths forward. While the new stream
criticizes the mainstream for intellectual habits which become
conceptual ruts, they too have their own favored forms of
analysis. One is to focus on the recurrence of dichotomies
in legal reasoning, such as utopian/apologist or
naturalist/positivist. 178 In our discussion of religious freedom we
have had the recurring dichotomies of universality and
particularity and of rationality and faith. But these dyads may
be better understood not as ideas in opposition, but as
complements. Benjamin Barber observes that "Jihad is not only
McWorld's adversary, it is its child. The two are thus locked
together in a kind of Freudian moment of the ongoing cultural
struggle, neither willing to coexist with the other, neither
complete without the other."179 Moreover, it may be that the
process of debate over a particular conception of the good will
178 See Purvis, supra note 36, at 104.
179 BARBER, supra note 59, at 157.
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actually lead to a universal value. For example, while
Koskenniemi views international law as having a distinctly
European heritage, he concludes:
The fact that international law is a European language does not
even slightly stand in the way of its being capable of expressing
something universal. For the universal has no voice, no
authentic representative of its own. It can only appear through
something particular; only a particular can make the universal
known.180
One can see such transitions from the particular to the
universal in other aspects of human rights which have gained a
wider (though not complete) acceptance across cultures, such as
the freedom of the press or the right to be free from torture. As
Thomas Franck would emphasize, the right process leads to
legitimacy, regardless of the substantive result.181 And so, we
can ask ourselves, as David Bederman queries: "Should the law
be abandoned, or modified, should its content or scope be
adjusted in accordance with political realities? The questions are
familiar to international lawyers continuously managing the
distance between aught and is, law and fact."182 While Father
Drinan readily concedes that success is not ensured, that the vast
gulf between is and aught may not be bridged, nonetheless the
attempt to make the transition is important in and of itself:
Many of the efforts of the human rights revolution are directed
toward harmonizing the legislative needs of the state with the
demands of sincere people of faith whose views collide with the
government's demands. It is probably correct to note that these
differences are inevitable, severe, and possibly irresolvable. But
law-and increasingly international law-must at least try to
resolve them. If international law does not make a sustained
effort to resolve these clashes, they will only grow worse. 183
To be a modernist in a post-modern world is not an easy
thing. But until post-modernism can posit a way forward, the
ongoing labors of Father Drinan and the modernists like him,
children of the Enlightenment but not Voltaire's bastards,
provide at least the possibility of social change (assuming of
course, that change is desirable).
180 Koskenniemi, supra note 73, at 115.
181 See FRANCK, supra note 166, at 24.
182 See BEDERMAN, supra note 37, at 94-96.
183 DRINAN, supra note 13, at 214.
TRIPTYCH
The modernists need to realize a few things that the new
stream authors understand. For one thing, the messiness of
modern politics is real and unavoidable. A rational argument
does not necessarily sway opinion or confer legitimacy and
sometimes it comes down to power politics. Institutions that
grow indigenously, however, tend to be more successful than
those that are transplanted. Thus, rather than using techniques
that are comfortable to the internationalists, such as
transnational tribunals, the internationalists may find that using
techniques (such as mediation and corporatist bargaining)
indigenous to a society will yield better results. In heterogeneity
process (without sacrificing the concept of the right),
international law may find increased effectiveness.
A related issue is that norms that evolve within a community
take deeper root than norms that are imposed. Father Drinan is
optimistic about "the sudden recognition of a right never.
considered before the mid-twentieth century."'1 4 But, while there
is a formal recognition of the right of religious freedom, it may
take time for this formal recognition to flower into consistent
state practice. And the unfortunate truth is that while such
flowering can be encouraged, it cannot be rushed.
For their part, the new stream authors have much to learn
from the modernists. If all structured systems, such as the
international human rights system, are inherently political and
an attempt to impose on one's version of the good, what should
one do? Put more brusquely, if law must come to a fight to
impose your will, what would you fight for?
Perhaps the most basic lesson is that at some point one has
to move from criticism to a plan of action. Despite volumes of
critiques about why various international institutions are
imperfect, to a greater or lesser degree they do actually work.
Trade and investment disputes are settled; human rights abusers
go to jail or pay fines; government policies change. Institution
building and transnational legal process can lead to real changes
in how people think and act.
Mainstream authors may say to their new stream colleagues:
at the end of the day, criticism is just talk. Results matter. Do
something. Father Drinan's proposal may not be perfect, but it's
184 DRINAN, supra note 13, at 233.
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a start. And the ongoing process of trying to find a solution may
be all the solution that exists.
